



Poland’s internal security as exemplified by the tasks and activities 
 of the Internal Security Agency in the period 2007–2015
Abstract: The text analyses Poland’s internal security illustrated with the example of the tasks and ac-
tivities of one of the Polish special services, the Internal Security Agency (pol. Agencja Bezpieczeństwa 
Wewnętrznego – ABW). Although the Internal Security Agency was established as a counter-intelli-
gence service, the scope of its tasks and activities places it among the criminal intelligence services, 
which is poorly effective in terms of the eradication of crime targeted at the state’s internal security.
 The analysis of the issues of state security in the context of the ISA’s activity has been elaborated in 
the present text with the following research questions: (1) To what extent does the statutory scope of the 
ISA’s tasks lower the effectiveness of the actions aimed at combating crime threatening state security? 
(2) To what extent does the structural pathology inside the ISA lower the effectiveness of the actions 
aimed at combating crime threatening state security?
 The text features an extensive analysis of three major issues: (1) the ISA’s statutory tasks (with par-
ticular consideration of de lege lata and de lege ferenda regulations), (2) the dysfunctional character of 
the ISA’s activity in relation to the scope of its statutory tasks, and (3) the structural pathology resulting 
from the ‘politicisation’ of the Internal Security Agency.
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Introduction
The following text analyses Poland’s internal security illustrated with the example of the tasks and activities of one of the Polish special services, the Internal Secu-
rity Agency (Polish: Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego – ABW). The scope of the 
analysis encompasses a description of the ISA’s statutory tasks as well as their compari-
son with day-to-day practice as regards crime elimination and prevention. The timeframe 
of the analysis covers the period 2007–2015, which is dictated by the actual influence 
exerted on the ISA’s activities by the executive and legislative authorities, namely one 
parliamentary coalition (Civic Platform and Polish People’s Party) as well as two con-
secutive Prime Ministers originating from the same political party, i.e. Civic Platform 
(Donald Tusk and Ewa Kopacz). As regards the Head of the Internal Security Agency, 
the period under discussion saw two executive officers: Krzysztof Bondaryk and Dariusz 
Łuczak. This fact is of great significance for our analysis, in particular with regard to set-
ting the priorities of action in the services in question.
The aim of the text is to demonstrate that the multitasking and ‘politicisation’ of the 
Internal Security Agency exerts a negative impact on the effectiveness of the actions 
undertaken to combat crime threatening state security. In order to further specify the sub-
ject matter of the research, we should pose the following questions: (1) To what extent 
does the scope of the ISA’s statutory tasks lower the effectiveness of the actions aimed 
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at combating crime threatening state security? (2) To what extent does the structural 
pathology inside the ISA lower the effectiveness of the actions aimed at combating crime 
threatening state security?
The research methodology constitutes a crucial issue here, as due to the restricted 
availability of information establishing facts must be based on the analysis and critique 
of indirect sources of information – which, most often, are materials drawing on the find-
ings of the mass media or statements articulated by experts in a given field (Apanowicz, 
2002, p. 72–73). As far as the analysis of the ISA’s statutory tasks is concerned, of the 
utmost importance here is their legal, teleological and functional interpretation. It should 
also be noted that the text relatively freely uses terms and categories created by R. Mer-
ton within the framework of structural functionalism (Baert, 1998, p. 54–59; Baert, da 
Silva, 2010, p. 71–78; Merton, 2002, p. 93–152, 197–265).
Two major issues tackled by Robert Merton were social structure and social anomy. 
We are dealing with the phenomenon of social anomy when there emerges a conflict 
between objectives (which have been culturally adopted) and the institutionalised means 
of their realisation (Merton, 1936, p. 894–904; Merton, 2002, p. 197–224). In the case of 
the realisation of culturally adopted objectives the socially defined and accepted means 
are omitted only to be freely replaced by some others. In this approach, one should 
search for the determinant of the dysfunctional behaviour in social and cultural sources. 
In the case of the assumption made in this text, the displays of organisational anomy of 
the Internal Security Agency can be illustrated through the analysis of the cases of or-
ganisational dysfunction and various instances of pathology which are in turn reflected 
in the structure of the Agency’s work.
The text consists of three major parts elaborating on the research topic, which are as 
follows: (1) an analysis of the ISA’s statutory tasks (with particular consideration of de 
lege lata and de lege ferenda regulations), (2) an analysis of the dysfunctional activity 
of the ISA in relation to the scope of its statutory tasks, and (3) an analysis of structural 
pathology resulting from the ‘politicisation’ of the Internal Security Agency.
Statutory objectives and tasks
The objectives assigned to the special services can be analysed either in the light of 
the material scope of the goals and activities specified by the legislator in the relevant le-
gal acts, or in a broader context, that is of a normative aspect, which follows from the ax-
iology of modern democracies and the activities of the public administration. The above 
assumption arises from the fact that public officials are required to act in an appropriate 
manner, that is such as would be lawful and ethical at the same time. Therefore, drawing 
on Robert Merton’s concept, it should be pointed out that the culturally sanctioned objec-
tives which form the system of values ascribed to the public sphere constitute a frame of 
reference in our analysis (Merton, 2002, p. 198–204).
Given the statutory scope of the ISA’s activity, it is interesting to note the legislative 
process that took place during the period under discussion, namely 2007–2015, when 
the project proceedings were realised first by the Council of Ministers (2013–2014), and 
then by the Parliament (2014–2015). However, it should be noted that discussions over 
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any amendments to the regulations governing the activity of special services in Poland 
are usually raised by a new government following parliamentary elections. A similar 
situation will certainly take place following the coming into power of the Law and Jus-
tice Party (PiS) at the end of 2015 (Cf. Kowalewski, 2015, p. 16–18).
The initiation of works and proceedings concerning new regulations on the Polish 
intelligence and counter-intelligence services resulted from the need to change the man-
agement of, and to increase the control over these services through establishing addi-
tional state institutions, which was reflected in consecutive draft laws. Moreover, a great 
number of solutions employed hitherto, for instance concerning operational control and 
telecommunications data access, were somewhat controversial, which was reflected in 
the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal (Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal 
of 30 July 2014).
It is impossible to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the range of all the changes, 
however, for the sake of the problem outlined in the introduction, it is only the issues re-
lated to the ISA’s statutory tasks defined by the legislator that are of relevance here. The 
first proposals for the scope of changes in the tasks and activities of the Polish counter-
intelligence services constituted merely a response to the alleged lack of a precise defini-
tion of the tasks in the Act of 2002, which was of some significance, inter alia, since the 
provisions constituted a justification for executing operational control by the services in 
question. Not only did the Draft Act on ISA of 1 August 2013 not limit its rights, but it 
also introduced the ISA’s own classification of crimes (i.e. crimes of a terrorist and ex-
tremist nature), which was alien to the existing penal code in Poland. Furthermore, the 
Draft Act maintained the wide range of tasks at the level of identification, prevention and 
elimination of threats that pose a risk to the state’s internal security and the constitutional 
order, as well as at the level of identification, prevention and detection of crime (Rosicki, 
2013; Rosicki, 2014, p. 107–118).
In comparison with the Act on the Internal Security Agency and the Foreign Intel-
ligence Agency of 2002, subsequent drafts pursued the former direction of more precise 
specification of tasks in terms of identifying, preventing and detecting crimes, with the 
aid of a catalogue of specific articles contained in the Polish Penal Code, with the attend-
ant division of tasks in relation to infringed interests. In the case of fiscal offences and 
crimes against property and to the detriment of the Treasury, the legislator introduced 
clearly defined values to narrow down the scope of the service’s activities regarding 
serious crimes and offences. On the other hand, in the case of identifying, preventing 
and eliminating threats aimed at the state’s internal security and the constitutional order, 
the legislator diminished the importance of related problems, for example drug-related 
offences.
On the grounds of the comparative analysis of Draft Acts of 2013, the Draft submit-
ted to the Sejm by the government (Sejm Document no. 2295) and the Act of 2002, the 
following conclusions can be drawn: (1) the capability to execute operational control 
in relation to the practice approved by the Act of 2002 still has not been decreased, 
(2) maintaining the wide scope of the ISA’s tasks places this service within the spectrum 
of criminal intelligence, (3) maintaining a wide scope of activities related to the eradica-
tion of economic crime results in the necessity of the numerical and qualitative improve-
ment of staff in a given area of expertise.
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The scope of tasks and activities of the Internal Security Agency as specified in Ar-
ticle 5 of the Act of 2002 and in Article 3 of the Draft Acts on ISA (2013–2014) aims to 
clearly define the legal framework for the functioning of the Polish counter-intelligence 
services in a manner that would help find the balance between the standards of a demo-
cratic state and the specific nature of the special services’ operation. The provisions in 
this respect are very often dictated by various lobby groups, such as representatives of 
the special services, politicians or representatives of organisations monitoring human 
rights. The scope of the special services’ activities thus constitutes a trouble spot between 
the state’s interests and the interests of individuals. The state, through various legal solu-
tions, which are more often than not based on too general and/or unspecific terms and 
definitions, as well as through applying more specific solutions to lower level acts, en-
dows itself with greater freedom of action, which results in weaker control in the hands 
of its citizens over the activities of the special services.
The introduction of amendments to the existing acts concerned with the ISA’s tasks 
is fuelled by the need to avoid any allegations to the effect that the ISA’s activities lack 
a transparent basis. Thus, the above-mentioned provisions should be treated as a start-
ing point in relation to the ISA’s competence with respect to the protection of internal 
security and the constitutional order of the Republic of Poland. On the one hand, these 
regulations specify the scope of competence of the government institution, and on the 
other, define the scope of legal protection guaranteed to citizens. Hence, in this case, we 
are dealing with legal modality, namely, powers, competences, and freedoms under legal 
protection, which can be specified in terms of the relations between state agencies and 
citizens (Wronkowska, Ziembiński, 2007, p. 100–121).
Dysfunctionality
The multitasking of the ISA is a grave functioning-related problem, which is reflected 
in the inadequate use of means and forces in the process of the eradication of crime 
threatening the state’s internal security. Despite the proclaimed amendments to the pro-
visions on the scope of the ISA’s tasks and activities, as a matter of fact not much has 
changed; however, it should be stressed that the invariably dual nature of the service’s 
tasks in terms of crime prosecution and prevention is permanently in effect. This duality 
follows from the realisation of tasks which in the theory of special services research are 
ascribed to both the internal intelligence and criminal intelligence services (Minkina, 
2014, p. 37–42). Such a task orientation gives rise to prosecuting both offences that are 
strictly criminal in their nature, but are still related to damage and losses of exorbitant 
value, as well as crimes against the state’s internal security. As regards the statutory 
provisions pertaining to the rationale behind the appointment of this service, it is usually 
their competence in the area of internal security and constitutional order that is pointed 
out; however, these provisions are far from the reality in the ISA’s day-to-day activities 
(Act on ISA, 2002, Art. 1).
The result of this task orientation is a lack of stability in the practice of prosecuting 
and preventing crime, as well as in the organisational practice of the Internal Security 
Agency. For instance, in the interim period when Krzysztof Bondaryk was leaving office 
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and Dariusz Łuczak was taking over, a structural reform was introduced at the central 
level, which was then implemented onto lower levels, i.e. in local branch offices. The 
crucial point of the reform was to combine the Counter-Intelligence Department with the 
Department of Terrorism Prevention and the Department of Economic and Organised 
Crime. This consolidation was copied at the level of individual local branch offices, 
which resulted in the establishment of a single Counter-Intelligence Department (De-
partment II). Due to the above consolidation, there emerged a need to appoint a single 
leader, which meant that the scope of Department II activity was determined by the 
origin and prior organisational identification of its head (terrorism, economic and organ-
ised crime, counter-intelligence, etc.). This results in a total lack of a coherent activity 
strategy in individual branch offices and at the central level as well.
The relations between the statutory tasks and the tasks prioritised by the management 
board of this special service may serve as the most blatant example of dysfunctionality 
in the Internal Security Agency. Among the priority tasks in the period at issue here was 
the fight against so-called VAT crimes, which can hardly be regarded as a major threat 
to the state’s internal security. Moreover, it can be easily observed that a considerable 
part of means and resources is dedicated to eradicating crime which should be tackled 
by other services, such as Fiscal Intelligence, the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau or the 
Central Prosecution Bureau.
Another example of dysfunctional character in the area of the effectiveness of elimi-
nating crime against the state’s internal security is the mechanism of the “anti-corrup-
tion shield,” which was proclaimed by Prime Minister Donald Tusk in 2008. The above 
figurative expression refers to “activities counter-acting any possible inadequacies in 
the most important processes of privatisation and public procurement” (Detailed Infor-
mation..., 2015). However, it soon transpired that the “anti-corruption shield” was yet 
another ‘media event,’ a part of the political rhetoric of the then government. The fact 
that the “anti-corruption shield” is non-existent is reflected in the strenuous attempts at 
protecting the document concerned with the establishment of the above tool, classifying 
its contents as “top secret” – the document was finally made public after two lost cases 
in the Provincial Administrative Court and one lost case in the Supreme Administra-
tive Court. The Polish government made every effort and engaged the courts to keep 
confidential the words uttered by the Head of ISA, Krzysztof Bondaryk, which read as 
follows: “ISA is particularly focused on eliminating such phenomena as political lobby-
ing and illegal business lobbying as well as on preventing the activity of foreign special 
services and organised crime” (Anti-Corruption Shield..., 2015). It is hard to find a more 
detailed analysis of the activities aimed at the eradication of corruption in the above 
mentioned document. This means that the political security of the government has taken 
precedence over the state’s internal security and the activities of the Polish special serv-
ices. In consequence, actual anti-corruption operations at the highest government level 
are undertaken by other special services, that is the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, 
nevertheless, it remains within the remit of this service.
As regards the protection extended over the State Treasury-owned companies and 
other strategic companies, it is a matter of dispute whether ISA ‘sleeper agents’ should 
operate within their structures. Although there is nothing extraordinary about the mere 
fact of delegating special agents to such companies, regarding the way state interests 
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are secured, still, the very formula of executing control- and information-related tasks 
remains highly disputable. A problematic issue appears here in the form of the remu-
neration of these ‘sleeper agents’ received from the companies in which they have been 
placed with a view to securing the state’s economic interests. The longer the special serv-
ices’ representatives serve in these companies, the greater is the risk they will display 
disloyalty towards the intelligence services and selectively pick information to be passed 
on their Agency (Cf. Decision of 16 February 2004).
It must be admitted that an inappropriate allocation of means and a dysfunctional 
definition of the objectives for the ISA’s operations, both in the statutory context, but 
above all in the practical area of crime eradication, serves to diminish the effective-
ness of the whole security system, which combines the activities of particular special 
services in Poland. Another example of the negative impact of the aforementioned dual 
organisational form of the Internal Security Agency is the necessity to co-operate with 
other special services in the area of economic crime eradication. In consequence, in the 
majority of cases the ISA does not perform its actions on its own, but in co-operation 
with, for example, the Central Bureau of Investigation, the Fiscal Intelligence Service 
or the Polish Border Guard. In terms of operational activities and legal proceedings, the 
status of the Internal Security Agency in comparison to that of the Central Bureau of 
Investigation appears much weaker in the following areas: (1) the number of staff mem-
bers in the operational and investigation-prosecution departments; (2) the education of 
staff members in the field of investigation (which comprises training procedures in the 
broad sense); (3) the professional background of the staff members in the investigation-
prosecution departments; (4) the level of centralisation of regional structures.
Pathology
One of the major pathologies in the functioning of the Internal Security Agency is 
the ‘politicisation’ of this special service (Cf. Grochowski, 2013, p. 195–207; Rosicki, 
2013). However, special care should be taken here over the understanding of the term 
‘politicisation,’ because special services, as state agencies, are by definition political in 
character, since they deal with the realisation of tasks set by politicians. Even more cru-
cial though is the differentiation between the term ‘politicisation’ as used in this text and 
‘party-dependency.’ In the latter case, particular services are treated as an area of politi-
cal exploitation in the context of a ‘spoils system.’ In Poland, a take-over of the special 
services is usually initiated by the appointment of new directors, only then the lower 
managerial positions are staffed, which is typically based on the actual possibilities of 
obtaining ‘informal’ support, rather than on individual skills and qualifications. It seems 
that the destabilisation related to the take-over by a new government and a parliamentary 
majority in the period under discussion was much slighter than in the first case after the 
year 1989, when the coalition of the same political parties maintained power. However, 
in the above mentioned period, various internal factors played a significant role, such as 
conflicts between different political factions inside the incumbent Civic Platform, which 
intended to exert influence on the management and staff appointment in the Internal Se-
curity Agency (Cf. Why..., 2013; Interview..., 2013).
PP 1 ’16 Poland’s internal security as exemplified by the tasks... 171
As an example of politically dictated and thus inadequate personnel selection may 
serve the appointment of Krzysztof Bondaryk, which raised doubts in connection with 
his involvement with private entities (one of the telecommunications companies) and 
some legal problems faced by some members of his immediate family (Head of ISA..., 
2008; Gmyz, 2008; A Bug Detector, 2008). It is most telling that the author of texts con-
cerning instances of dubious behaviour of the former head of the ISA was himself acquit-
ted both in criminal matters and in cases liable to civil action (Małuch, 2013). Moreover, 
it should be emphasised that certain journalists credited Krzysztof Bondaryk with being 
the moving spirit behind unwarranted wiretapping which was allegedly applied to con-
duct covert surveillance of the President of the Republic of Poland, his staff, as well as 
journalist circles critical of Donald Tusk’s government – for the sake of which the know-
how and the infrastructure of a private telecommunications company were allegedly 
employed (The ISA is Probably Eavesdropping on Journalists, 2011; The Government 
Is Eavesdropping on You, 2011; Ścios, 2011; The Story of the ISA’s Head..., 2009; In-
terview..., 2013; Miter, 2015b). While in the case of the abuse of state institutions in the 
above mentioned surveillance, the mass media pointed to reliable sources, in the case of 
the telecommunications companies they indicated only the hypothetical use of so-called 
“technical connections.”
It is an open question then why such a controversial candidate was considered as the 
Head of the Internal Security Agency in the first place. In an interview Andrzej Zyberto-
wicz, one of the Polish special services analysts, offered an explanation for the appoint-
ment of Krzysztof Bondaryk as head of the ISA: “To my mind, Donald Tusk ‘inherited’ 
Krzysztof Bondaryk from one of the oligarchs, and so he was forced to accept this dowry 
in return for the support in his run for power. The ‘heritage’ came in handy in the period 
of stability” (Interview..., 2013). It is noteworthy here that this “oligarch” was the owner 
of one of the biggest media companies and co-owner of the telecommunications com-
pany in which Krzysztof Bondaryk was employed.
The manner in which Internal Security Agency staff are selected and the shape of the 
training system in specific areas of activity in individual departments may also be termed 
structural pathology. Deeply rooted processes in this respect (including the accompany-
ing phenomena already mentioned in the text) result in the organisational dysfunctional-
ity of this special service as far as the eradication of crimes against the state’s internal 
security are concerned. The high staff turnover related to the negative effects of the 
existing ‘spoils system,’ as well as the lack of stability of employment, force the prop-
erly qualified employees to quit working for the Agency (Latkowski, Majewski, 2015, 
p. 16–17). Such a state of affairs causes a discontinuance in pursuing organisational 
objectives both at the central and regional levels. Moreover, it should be pointed out that 
the ISA’s personnel is mostly composed of young people, which can be viewed both as 
an advantage and a disadvantage, as counter-intelligence protection and investigation-
prosecution activities chiefly depend on experience, and young individuals are not able 
to learn the intricacies of this profession at such short notice. Therefore, the Internal 
Security Agency does not necessarily appear as a structure proficient in completing its 
tasks, acquiring and sharing reliable knowledge, modifying and adapting to new experi-
ences (Cf. Garvin, 1993, p. 78–91; Kirwan, 2013, p. 69–81). However, it is relatively 
flexible regarding the ongoing changes in the executive and the legislature.
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The managerial problems pertain to staff selection and management both at the cen-
tral and lower levels. Consequently, the ISA lacks the discipline and ethos which should 
be a hallmark of services ensuring the state’s internal security. As an example here may 
serve: (1) the death of the Head of the Counter-Intelligence Department in Warsaw in 
2014; (2) the death of a civil service officer in the ISA’s headquarters in Magdalenka 
in 2015; (3) the suicide of an ISA officer in 2013; (4) the case of assault and battery of 
Jacek Mąka, the vice-president of the ISA in 2012. In the first case, the officer died on the 
premises of the Department, and only later on did it turn out that he had not undergone 
the obligatory medical tests for the previous three years in a row. In the second case, the 
body of the officer was found after an evening drinking party. In the third case, according 
to reports in the mass media, the alleged reason behind the suicide was that the officer 
had fallen victim to mobbing by his immediate superior. The last case stirred quite a con-
troversy, as it involved a person in one of the uppermost echelons of the ISA. According 
to the information in the mass media, Jacek Mąka was allegedly assaulted by one of his 
subordinates due to improper behaviour, i.e. maintaining relations highly inappropriate 
for a uniformed officer (Has Jacek Mąka, the vice-president of ISA, been beaten up?, 
2012; Latkowski, Majewski, 2015, p. 16–17). In 2012, J. Mąka left the ranks of the ISA, 
and in the same year 400–500 ISA staff members followed suit, due to the working con-
ditions in this institution (The ISA vice-president has resigned from his post..., 2012).
The lack of control on the part of the superiors resulted in an incident with a missing 
computer at the Wrocław branch office; the computer contained special data on all opera-
tives – this information could be classified as “top secret” (ISA in the depths of pathol-
ogy!, 2015). A similar example of the lack of professionalism on the part of the manage-
rial staff in this particular branch consists in the inadequate protection of the building 
designed for the operational officers, as in the period in question there was no problem 
with recording their images and identities (Miter, 2015a, p. 23). However, the greatest 
shortcoming the managerial staff are to be blamed for was the poor supervision over the 
work of moles whose task was to provide operational information. It was the Wrocław 
branch office whose officers co-operated with Marek Falenta, who was accused of com-
missioning the interception of telephone calls of public officials, including the Prime 
Minister – Donald Tusk, the Deputy Prime Minister – Elżbieta Bieńkowska, the Minister 
of the Interior – Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs – Radosław 
Sikorski, the Minister of Transport, Construction and Maritime Economy – Sławomir 
Nowak, the President of the National Bank of Poland – Marek Belka, and the Head of 
the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau – Paweł Wojtunik. Some of the mass media pointed 
to the fact that all the people recorded were either current or former officers of the Polish 
special services (Miter, 2015b; Reading Room at Uncle’s, 2015, p. 12–16; Marek Falen-
ta..., 2015, p. 17; Much Ado About Nothing?, 2015; The Hunt for the Richest Poles..., 
2015). Hence, a conclusion may be drawn that the lack of control exercised by the mana-
gerial staff at the central and regional levels poses a direct threat to the state’s internal 
security and its constitutional order. The more so, as in the accounts of some of the mass 
media there are recordings of conversations featuring Prime Minister Donald Tusk, not 
only in public places such as restaurants, but also on government premises (Gmyz, 2015, 
p. 18–21). It follows that the special service responsible for the security of information 
and counter-intelligence protection is failing to carry out its statutory tasks. Probably, the 
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most discreditable recordings are the ones of Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s ministers, 
above all Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, the Minister of the Interior, who used to work for the 
Office for State Protection (Urząd Ochrony Państwa, the Polish intelligence agency in 
the period 1990–2002, later replaced by the Internal Security Agency and the Foreign 
Intelligence Agency) as an officer and a chief advisor to the management board of the 
intelligence department in this special service, whereas at the time of the recordings he 
was responsible for the supervision of the operations of the ISA itself.
Conclusion
The subject of the analysis here is Poland’s internal security, as exemplified by the 
tasks and activities of the Internal Security Agency. The material scope and the time-
frame of the analysis are clearly specified, and hence the text does not address all the 
issues related to the operation of the Polish counter-intelligence services. The above 
limitation primarily follows from the fact that the source materials on the issues in ques-
tion are either restricted, inaccessible, or scarce. The restricted scope of this analysis is 
closely related to the fact that it aimed at answering the research questions arriving at the 
following conclusions:
(1) To what extent does the statutory scope of the ISA’s tasks lower the effectiveness of 
preventive actions against crime threatening state security?
The analysis of the tasks defined in the de lege lata and de lege ferenda regulations per-
taining to the ISA’s activities indicates that, due to such provisions, these special services 
are ineffective as regards the eradication of crime typically targeted at the state’s internal 
security. The invariable multitasking orientation of these special services as specified in 
the de lege lata and de lege ferenda regulations places the ISA among the criminal intel-
ligence services, which is a negative element. The proposals for amendments presented 
in the period 2013–2015 failed to boost the effectiveness of the ISA’s activities. What is 
more, the proposed amendments do not ensure that the ISA will become an entity acting 
independently in the area of economic, fiscal, and drug-related crimes. It is necessary 
to introduce changes that will place the ISA high on the ladder of counter-intelligence 
services dealing with the issues of crimes against the state and information. In effect, 
the structures of one of the special services dealing with economic crimes, that is either 
the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and/or Fiscal Intelligence Service (reporting to the 
General Inspector of Fiscal Control), should be reinforced.
(2) To what extent does the structural pathology inside the ISA lower the effectiveness 
of preventive actions against crimes threatening state security?
The lack of effective supervision on the part of the executive and the legislature, as 
well as the lack of control on the part of managerial staff over the actions of particular 
officers, has resulted in the rise of structural pathologies inside the Internal Security 
Agency. Additionally, it should be pointed out that one of the major problems is the 
inappropriate selection of personnel, who as a result lack the necessary qualifications 
and fail to meet the ethical requirements, namely they lack the ethos which is intrinsi-
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cally related to the operation of the special services. The problem of adequate personnel 
is intertwined with the lack of sound, transparent rules and instruments for promotion 
inside the structures of the ISA. The training system is ineffective and thus cannot solve 
the above problems. It is most intriguing why there exists no training system that would 
be based on at least two long-term stages of training – for non-commissioned officers 
and for commissioned ones.
Summing up, it is the ‘politicisation’ of the special services, the inadequate selection 
of personnel, the lack of an appropriate training system and the lack of the necessary 
supervision that account for the abuse of the services’ potential, originally intended to 
prevent crimes threatening state security. In order to eliminate the ISA’s dysfunctional 
character and its organisational inaccuracies, better human resources management inside 
the ISA should be developed.
The following, general conclusion may be drawn from this analysis: the special serv-
ices sector in Poland needs to undergo thorough reform; a reform that would provide 
for the greater specialisation of particular departments in the Polish special services. In 
the case of the services dealing with economic and fiscal crime, there is an urgent need 
for quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of these formations. Moreover, it seems 
crucial to develop a new formula for exerting control over the services at executive and 
legislative level, including supervision of the relations between superiors and their sub-
ordinates inside the special services.
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Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne Polski na przykładzie zadań i działalności 
Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego w latach 2007–2015 
 
Streszczenie
Przedmiotem analizy w tekście jest bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne Polski, które prezentowane jest 
przez pryzmat zadań i działań Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (ABW), tj. jednej z polskich 
służb specjalnych. Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego powstała jako służba kontrwywiadowcza, 
jednakowoż zakres jej zadań sytuuje ją w ramach wywiadu kryminalnego, co należy uznać za mało 
efektywne w związku ze zwalczaniem przestępstw skierowanych przeciwko państwu. 
Analiza problematyki bezpieczeństwa państwa w kontekście działalności Agencji Bezpieczeństwa 
Wewnętrznego została uściślona w tekście przez następujące pytania badawcze: (1) W jakim zakresie 
ustawowy zakres zadań Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego wpływa na niską efektywność zwal-
czania przestępstw skierowanych przeciwko bezpieczeństwu państwa? (2) W jakim zakresie patologie 
strukturalne w ramach Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego wpływają na niską efektywność zwal-
czania przestępstw skierowanych przeciwko bezpieczeństwu państwa?
W pracy dokonano szerszej analizy trzech głównych zagadnień: (1) zadań ustawowych Agencji 
Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego ujętych w regulacjach de lege lata i de lege ferenda), (2) dysfunkcjonal-
ności działalności Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego w związku z zakresem zadań ustawowych 
i (3) patologii strukturalnej w związku z upolitycznieniem Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego.
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